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POPULATION STATUTES UNDER THE
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION*
DOUGLAS D. BATCHEJ.()R ."
Another of the so-called "population" statutes has been
declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court
in its recent decision in Crandon v. Hazlett.' This case
is representative of a class deserving of the highest scutiny.
There are today about 15002 Florida statutes pertaining
to counties or cities of a particular population and which
have been enacted as general laws. In recent years the
Supreme Court has held an amazingly high percentage
of these laws which have come before it to be unconstitu-
tional, saying they are in reality local laws. As a majority
of these statutes have never been tested in the courts and
as each succeeding legislature adds a few hundred more
similar statutes, it may be well to consider what con-
stitutes a general law classified according to population
and what does not.
The 1945 Legislature passed a statute' authorizing the
county commission of each county having a population
of more than 260,000 according to the last federal census
and having a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to
create a County Board of Visitors. The act further stated
that each Board of Visitors existing in such a county when
* This article, which was submitted by the student board of the Miami
Law Quarterly to the Florida Bar Journal, was published in the Febru-
ary, 1947, issue of the Journal. The footnotes were, however, inad-
vertently omitted, and the article is published here in full by agreement
with the Florida Bar Journal so that the extensive source material on
which the article is based will be available to Florida attorneys.
** Member of the Florida Bar; A.B., University of North Carolina,
1942; L.L.B., University of Miami, 1947; former Associate Editor of the
Miami Law Quarterly.
1 26 So. 2d 638.
2 Based on actual count of county population act in 27 FSA.
3 Ch. 23053, Acts of 1945.
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the act became law was abolished, and its powers were
vested in the county commission. A prior statute had au-
thorized the appointment of such a board in all of the
counties by the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Rela-
tions Court.4 The Probation Officer of the Juvenile Court
of Dade County, the only county affected by the 1945
statute, sought to enjoin the Dade County Commission
from taking any action in pursuance of the statute, alleg-
ing, among other grounds, that it was in reality a local
act and that the provisions of the Florida Constitution
relative to such statutes had not been complied with.
The Florida Constitution provides that the legislature
shall pass no special or local laws pertaining to certain
specified subjects, one of which is regulating the duties
of any class of officers except municipal officers.5 An-
other section of the Constitution requires publication of
notice prior to the introduction of any local legislation.
It is further required that an affidavit in proof of such
publication must be entered upon the journals of the legis-
lature and also filed with the Secretary of State, or, in
the alternative, the act must be submitted to a local refer-
endum.6
The Florida Supreme Court held that the act in ques-
tion was a local law and therefore unconstitutional as the
provisions of Sec. 21, Art. III, had not been complied with.
While recognizing that population may be a basis for classi-
fication and that an act may be general without applying
to all of the counties of the State, the Court found the
present act to be bad in two respects. By providing that
the Board of Visitors in existence at the time the statute
became law was thereby abolished the act is forever limited
to Dade County as it is the only county of more than
260,000 with such a board in existence at the time the
statute became law. Since the power of the County Com-
mission to appoint a new board is based on the abolition
of the existing board, the entire act hinges on the validity
4 FSA 416.07.
Art. 3, Sec. 20, Fla. Constitution.
6 Art. 3, See. 21, Fla. Constitution.
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of this provision. The second basis for holding the statute
a local law was that there existed no reasonable basis for
the classification by population. The Court could not' see
why the Judge of the Juvenile Court in counties over
260,000 would not be just as capable of appointing a Board
of Visitors as the judges in the other counties.
This decision is undoubtedly in line with the prior de-
cisions of the Florida Supreme Court. It will be noted
that population statutes passed as general laws but which
are actually local laws may be held unconstitutional either
because the constitution prohibits local laws on that par-
ticular subject,7 or because the provisions relative to local
laws have not been complied with.1 In either event the
tests as to whether the statute is in fact a general law
are the same. The Court has demanded two main re-
quisites, as it has done in the principal case. First, the
act must be potentially applicable to any county. It cannot
by its own terms be forever limited to any one, or to any
particular group of counties. It must be left open so that
other counties attaining that population in the future
will also be included 9 Therefore, a statute may not be
limited to counties having a population of over 130,000
according to the census of 1925.10 Neither may an act
authorizing a special election be called within thirty days
after its passage be limited to counties between 145,000
and 155,000.11 Such an act forever limits its application to
those counties having such a population at the time the
act is passed. The statute in the principal case is quite
similar in its effect to this example. In order to satisfy
the requirement that the act be potentially applicable
throughout the State the statute should apply to all coun-
ties in a certain population group according to the last
7 Art. 3, Sec. 20, Fla. Constitution.
R Art. 3, Sec. 21, Fla. Constitution.
1) Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280 (1885); Sparkman v. County Budget
Comm., 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809 (1931); Fort v. Dekle, 138 Fla. 871, 190
So. 542 (1939); State ex re]. Coleman v. York, 139 Fla. 300, 190 So.
599 (1939).
10 Whitney v. Hillsborough County, 99 Fla. 628, 127 So. 486 (1930).
'I Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction, 102 Fa. 708, 136 So.
334 (1931).
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proceeding state or federal census. 2 Such clauses are con-
sidered progressive and do not limit their application to
the last census prior to the passage of the act. Even the
clause "according to the last federal census" has been held
to be progressive,'3 despite Mr. Justice Ellis' dissenting
remarks that only those who thought the wording should
have been different could reach such a conclusion.
The second main requirement is that there must be some
reasonable basis for the classification based on population.
Arbitrary classification by population will not be allowed.' 4
In determining what is reasonable the Court seems to have
taken a stricter approach since the amendment of Sec.
21, Art. III, of the Constitution in 1928. Prior to that
amendment the legislature was considered the sole judge
as to the question of prior publication of notice before
the introduction of a local law." Therefore, even if the
act might be void as a general law it would still be opera-
tive as a local law since the courts could not inquire into
its method of passage. 6 Possibly because of this situation
few cases were presented to the court for their determina-
tion on the question of the reasonableness of a purported
general statute passed prior to 1928. And in those that
were presented the Court seemed to find little difficulty
in declaring the act reasonable, intimating that the Court
would only upset legislative findings of reasonableness if
the act was purely arbitrary." At the same time the Court
pointed out that even though it were a local law it would
still be valid.1
The question of what is reasonable, therefore, should be
answered by the cases based on statutes passed since 1928.
In these instances the Court's decision as to the reason-
ableness is decisive in the determination of the case. A
12 State ex rel. Buford v. Smith, 88 Fla. 151, 101 So. 350 (1924);
Sparkman v. County Budget Comm., supra.
1 State ex rel. Buford v. Daniels, 87 Fla. 270; 99 So. 804 (1924).
14 State ex rel. Buford v. Shepard, 84 FIa. 206, 93 So. 667 (1922);
Waybight v. Duval County, 142 Fla. 875, 196 So. 430 (1940).
is Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 10 So. 688 (1892).
16 waybrlght v. Duval County, supra.
17 State ex rel. Buford v. Smith, supra.
1 State ex rel. Buford v. Smith, supra; State ex rel. Buford v. Daniels,
supra.
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statute may no longer be declared inoperative as a general
law, yet still be operative as a local one.19 In recent years
the Court has been unable to see the reasonableness of
classification based on population in such statutes as those
calling for special school district elections in counties of
from 145,000 to 155,000;20 setting salaries of county of-
ficials different from those prevailing both in counties
a little larger and a little smaller;21 transferring the juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court to the County Court in
counties of 14,000 to 14,200;2 appropriating a share of
the county's racing funds to municipal hospitals in coun-
ties of from 14,000 to 14,200 ;23 setting the hours in which
whiskey can be sold in counties over 265,00024 and pro-
viding for the nomination of county commissioners by the
entire county and not by districts in counties of from
18,500 to 18,800.5
On the other hand, the Court has upheld the reasonable-
ness of statutes setting up budget commissions in counties
over 150,000,26 and in counties of from 43,000 to 53,00027
(the latter was upheld by a three to three court.); regulat-
ing the showing of movies in towns over 6,000 and impos-
ing certain safety measures for protection against fire;28
and giving the county commission the right to set up water
conservation districts in counties over 265,000.29
It appears that three main conclusions may be drawn
from the Florida decisions. First, the act must be open
for future qualification and potentially applicable through-
out the state. In determining this point the court is not
19 Waybright v. Duval County, supra.
20 Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction, sttpr .
21 Stripling v. Thomas, 101 Fla. 1015, 132 So. 824 (1921); Barrow v.
Smith, 119 Fla. 468, 158 So. 818 (1935); Latham v. Hawkins, 121 Fla.
324, 163 So. 709; State ex rel. Juvenal v. Neville, 163 Fla. 745, 167 So.
650 (1936); Manatee County v. Davidson, 132 Fla. 295, 181 So. 889
(1938).
22 State ex rel. Watson v. Roberts, 156 Fla. -, 25, So. 2d 888 (1946).
23 State ex rel. Parrish v. Lee, 156 Fla. -, 23 So. 2d 731 (1945).
24 State ex rel. Baldwin v. Coleman, 148 Fla. 155, 3 So. 2d 802 (1941).
25 State ex rel. Levine v. Bailey, 124 Fla. 266, 168 So. 12 (1936).
26 Sparkman v. County Budget Comm. supra.
27 State ex rel. Landis v. Williams, 112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).
2S Gandy v. Borras, 114 Fla. 503, 154 So. 248 (1934).
29 City of Coral Gables v. Crandon, 156 Fla. -, 25 So, 2d 1 (1946).
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content to merely see if the act includes words making
it subject to any future census but looks into all of its
provisions to determine if it is in fact so potentially ap-
plicable? 0 Second, population must be a reasonable basis
for the classification. This test is the biggest pitfall, and
because of the variety of acts that are classified according
to population no definite standards may be set up. Each
act must be considered individually. But it is evident from
the decided cases that the courts do not look with favor
upon such acts unless there is a real basis for such class-
ificiation. Artificial classification is not tolerated.' Third,
in determining the reasonableness of the classification a
more stringent test seems to be applied when the counties
affected lie in between two population figures, for ex-
ample, when the statute applies to counties between 165,000
and 180,000 rather than to all counties above or below a
certain population. Where a county is bracketed it must
be shown that there is a reasonable basis for applying in
those counties a law different from that controlling coun-
ties a little larger and a little smaller.32 In the other in-
stances it can be argued that the reasonableness is based on
the distinction between large and small counties.
As each state's decisions on this point are necessarily
based on their own state constitution and as most state
constitutions vary, it is evident that no strict analysis can
be made between the Florida decisions and those in other
states. However, it is possible to point out trends in other
jurisdictions which differ from those prevailing in Florida.
Since all states differ to some degree Pennsylvania has
been selected as a representative of the states adhering
to a more liberal view of general laws classified according
to population.
3u Anderson v. Board of Public Instruction, supra; Crandon v. Hazlett,
supra.
31 Crandon v. Hazlett, supra; Waybright v. Duval County, supra; Statc
ex rel. Buford v. Shepard, supra.
32 Waybright v. Duval County, supra; Latham v. Hawkins, ,supra;
Jordan v. State ex rel. Davis, 100 Fla. 494, 129 So. 747 (1930j.
33 waybright v. Duval County, supra.
34 State constitutional provisions relative to special laws may be
roughly classified into five groups:
(1) Those imposing no restrictions. Vermont.
[Vol. I
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Originally, the Pennsylvania Constitution was quite
similar to that of Florida's prior to the 1928 amendment.
But in 1923 the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended
to give the legislature the power to classify according to
population, and all laws relating to each class are deemed
to be general legislation." Although the Pennsylvania
Court states that there still must be a valid basis for such
classification, they nevertheless point out that cases on
unreasonable classification decided prior to 1923 are no
longer in point as the purpose was to liberalize statutes
classified according to population. 6 This amended section
of the Constitution was relied upon to declare valid a
general law giving cities of the first class (all over 1,000,-
000) 1 the power to appropriate money to pay for services
already rendered and materials already used in staging
a Sesqui-centennial Exhibition." It is evident that such
an act could not remain open since only those cities of
(2) Those providing for classification and deeming laws passed for
each class to be general laws. Pa., Art. III, Sec. 34.
(3) Those prohibiting certain special laws only. Idaho, Art. 3, Sec. 19;
N.Y., Art. 3, Sec. 17; N.C., Art. 2, Sec. 29; Ore., Art. 3, Sec. 23;
Wis., Art. 4, Sec. 31.
(4) Those prohibiting certain special laws and also prohibiting special
laws where general laws can be made applicable. Ariz., Art. 4,
Sec. 19; Colo., Art. 5, Sec. 25; Ill., Art. 4, Sec. 22; Iowa, Art. 3,
Sec. 30; Neb., Art. 3, See. 18; N. M., Art. 4, Sec. 24; N.D., Sec. 69,
70; S.C., Art. 3, Sec. 34; SD., Art. 3, Sec. 23; Wyo., Art. 3,
Sec. 27: Minn., Art. 4, Sec. 33; Kan., Art. 2, Sec. 17.
(5) Those also requiring notice of proposed act to be published anti
causing proof to be made, or requiring a local referendum. Ale.,
Sec. 106; Fla., Art. 3, Sec. 21; Mich., Art. 5, Sec. 30; N.J., Art. 7,
Sec. 9; Okla., Art. 5, Sec. 46, 32; Texas, Art. 3, Sec. 56, 57.
I Art. 3, Sec. 34, Pa. Constitution: "The legislature shall have the
power to classify counties, cities, burroughs, school districts, and town-
ships according to population and all laws passed relating to each class,
and all laws passed relating to, and regulating procedure and proceed-
ings in curt with reference to, any class, shall be deemed general legis-
lation within the meaning of this Constitution; but counties shall not be
divided into more than eight classes, cities into not more than seven
classes,
3;6 Comm. ex. rel. Kelley v. Centrell, 327 Pa. 369, 193 Atl. 635; Haver-
ford Tp. v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 28 A.2d 786.
37 53 Pa. Stat. 1.
38 Sambor v. Hadley, 291 Pa. -395, 140 At. 347.
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the first class that had already staged such an exhibition
were affected.
So far, Florida has officially chosen a much more con-
servative road than that taken by Pennsylvania, as evi-
denced by the Florida constitutional amendment of 1928
and the cases herein cited. But the flood of population
acts being passed by the legislature, which the legislators
undoubtedly deem necessary, seems to indicate a strong
desire on the part of the State's law makers to incorporate
into Florida's constitutional framework a more liberal
system for the interpretation of population statutes. Cer-
tainly the existing situation is far from desirable. The past
decisions of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that many
of the 1500 odd population acts which have been passed
as general laws, and which have not been contested in
the courts, are probably unconstitutional. This unhealthy
situation can only be remedied in one of two ways.
Under the present system of laws it would be necessary
for the legislature to make a more determined attempt
to stay within the bounds prescribed by the Constitution
and the Court. The practice of enacting population stat-
utes which have not been carefully prepared to meet these
standards would have to be curtailed. It would be necessary
to stop enacting such laws with only the hope that they
will meet with judicial approval, or as is the more probable
case, with the hope that no one will ever contest them.
However, in the light of past practice the accomplish-
ment of this end appears doubtful. Unless some other
method is achieved it is probable that our cities and coun-
ties will continue to operate under many statutes which
are, at best, of doubtful constitutionality.
The other available remedy calls for a revision of the
Constitution and statutes relative to classification by pop-
ulation. 9 This is the road taken by Pennsylvania. With
the inevitable continuing growth of several large met-
39 A step in this direction was taken in 1934 when Art. 3, Sec. 24 of the
Florida Constitution was amended to include the following: "The Legis-
lature shall by general law classify cities and towns according to popu-
lation, and shall by general law provide for their incorporation, govern-
ment, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges under such classifica-
[Vol. I
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ropolitan areas, and with the continuing spread among
the population of the counties and cities, it might be wise
for the state to recognize the need for greater classifica-
tion by population and permit any law relating to a def-
inite predetermined class to be deemed general legisla-
tion.40 Although this system undoubtedly leads to a more
diversified system of laws among the different cities and
counties of the state, it may be that the resulting case in
adapting the laws to the local needs will in the long run
prove advantageous. Certainly such a system would go
far towards eliminating the present undesirable status
of many of Florida's population acts.
tions, and no special or local laws incorporating cities or towns, provid-
ing for their government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges shall
be passed by the Legislature." However, to date, the Legislature has
never exercised its power granted by this provision and no classifications
have ever been made. The courts have held that until such time as
classifications are set up by the Legislature the clause prohibiting cer-
tain special or local laws is inoperative. Bryan v. City of Miami, 139
Fla. 650, 190 So. 772, and cases cited therein.
40 See note 35, supra.
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